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Abstract
This paper examines whether cartel breakdown provokes a period of intensive merger
activity amongst the former cartelists, designed to re-establish tacit collusion. Using
a novel application of recurrent event survival analysis for a pooled sample of 84
European cartels, it nds that mergers are indeed more frequent post-cartel break-
down, especially in markets which are less concentrated. However, it cautions against
merely assuming that these mergers are motivated by coordinated e¤ects - alterna-
tively, they may be the consequence of market restructuring, necessitated by more
intense competition post-cartel. Further disaggregated analysis of the individual
mergers show that on average these mergers are protable for the acquiring com-
pany, and that the tacit collusion motive is likely to be at work for a large minority
of the mergers.
Keywords: collusion, mergers, long-term e¤ect, recurrent events, survival analy-
sis
JEL Classication codes: C41, L10, L41
1 Introduction
Anti-cartel enforcement is widely heralded as the single most important part of an-
titrust policy. For this reason it is somewhat surprising that there have been relatively
few studies analysing how markets react to the elimination of cartels. This paper
takes a dynamic approach in examining what happens in markets in the years after a
competition authority (CA) has successfully prosecuted a cartel. Do markets revert
to competitive behaviour or do rms nd alternative ways of reinstating collusive
equilibria (short of cartelisation) in the longer run?
The most common approach for assessing the impact of cartel policy has been to
examine post-cartel prices, and a common method for quantifying overcharge is to
compare post-cartel against within-cartel period prices. While this approach can be
illuminating, suitable price data are often unavailable, especially over anything more
than the short-term. Here instead we turn to a more indirect approach in order to
use types of longer-run data which are more readily available, namely on quantity
and market structure. This follows the insight of seminal works in the early 1990s
by Sutton (1991), and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who showed, using very di¤erent
analytical approaches, how information about market shares and structure can be
informative about the competitive process, even without information on price and
prots.
In this case, the market structure changes are often typically achieved by mergers.
We have collected data on mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures (hereafter referred
to under the catch-all merger) between rms involved in those cartels for which the
European Commission (EC) issued decision documents between 1990 and 2012. We
pose two questions. First, was there more intense merger activity amongst the former
cartelists in the years immediately following breakdown? Second, is there evidence
that these mergers were motivated by coordinated e¤ects?
The methodological novelty of the paper lies in our approach to the rst of these
questions. We rule out a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) approach for vari-
ous reasons (most importantly because the data are censored and there is a lack of
appropriate counterfactual). Instead, we apply a recurrent event survival analysis,
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which is ideal for applications such as this. Moreover, the characteristics of hazard
analysis allow us to think of the time period immediately following cartel breakdown
as the treatment group, and the later years as the control. Therefore we are test-
ing whether the hazard of a merger is highest following cartel breakdown against
the counterfactual of merger hazard that is constant over time periods. Unlike in
standard survival analysis, here failureis recurrent (the typical market has more
than one subsequent merger) and this requires use of less standard recurrent failure
survival models. We show how our main hypothesis can be tested directly for the
pooled sample by a straightforward test on the curvature of the Weibull distribution.
Our results conrm that there is indeed evidence of more intensive post-breakdown
merger activity. This is most pronounced for (i) the subset of cartels which were de-
tected only after they had already broken down, and (ii) those in relatively less
concentrated markets. Our explanation for (i) is that breakdown due to natural
causesis indicative of a cartel which has become internally unstable. With formal
collusion unsustainable, this increases the appeal of tacit collusion, but this neces-
sitates mergers in order to achieve a structure conducive to tacit collusion. On (ii)
there are two alternative explanations: in industries which are already more concen-
trated, mergers may be unnecessary for collusion; but alternatively, rms may be
deterred from merging because they anticipate CA intervention.
In order to assess how far mergers after cartel are explicable in terms of the col-
lusive motive, we introduce two screens using disaggregated data on the individual
mergers. These are designed to identify how frequently the mergers would lead to
market structures usually viewed by the CA as necessary for coordinated e¤ects (be-
cause they enhance symmetry amongst leading rms); and how the nancial markets
react to the mergers by marking up the values of both the acquiring rm and its rivals
(conventionally interpreted in the event study literature as indicative of coordinated
e¤ects). Taken together, these screens suggest that in at least a signicant minor-
ity of cases, post-cartel mergers may have had the e¤ect of dampening competition
through tacit collusion.
This study belongs to a wider tradition in which mergers are viewed as triggered
by some industry shock. Reviewing the relevant literature Mitchell and Mulherin
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(1996) identies deregulation, oil price shocks, foreign competition, or and nan-
cial innovations as a triggering event. In our case, the shock that may lead to
increased merger activity is cartel breakdown. More specically, the literature on
mergers subsequent to cartel can be traced back, through Bittlingmayer (1985) and
Mueller (1996), to the rst great merger wave in the US at the beginning of the 20th
century, following the Sherman Act prohibition of cartels. Something very similar
was observed in the UK following the Restrictive Trade Practices Act in the 1950s.
Symeonides(2002) extensive research on this provides more indirect evidence that
prohibition of cartels preceded a major restructuring in parts of the UK economy.
The main implication for policy makers was highlighted by Evenett and Levenstein
and Suslow (2001, pp.1245): (V)igilance should not end with a cartelspunishment,
as former price-xers often try to e¤ectively restore the status quo ante by merging
or by taking other steps that lessen competitive pressures and raise prices.
More recently, three studies have returned to the topic, but at a more micro
level within a jurisdiction (the EU) in which cartels are already illegal, and where
the event is not some major natural experiment but rather the busting of individual
cartels. Kumar et al. (2013) show that for 45% of cartels reported by the EC between
2001-2010, there were mergers between the former cartelists in following years, and
that this was twice as likely in markets where buyers were fragmented. They use this
to motivate their theoretical modelling of the choice between collusion and merger
when faced with buyer resistance. In a subsequent paper by Marx and Zhou (2014)
they make further use of their sample, and test how various policy changes, such as
the introduction of leniency programmes, a¤ected the intensity of post-cartel merger
activity. Hüschelrath and Smuda (2013) also employ a sample of EC cartels. But
in their case, the merger data do not relate directly to the cartelists, but rather the
amount of aggregate worldwide/EEA merger activity in the industries to which the
cartel markets belong. Pooling the industries, they calculate that merger activity was
(up to) 83% higher in the 3 years after, than in the 3 years before cartel detection.
Our own study is based on a similar sample of EU cartels, and also examines the
proposition that merger is a second best which is only pursued once the rst best
(cartel) is no longer possible. However, we di¤er from these papers in a number of
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respects. Kumar et als empirical objective is limited to motivating their theoretical
model, establishing whether merger after cartel varies with buyer resistance they
provide no evidence on whether mergers were more prevalent after detection than
before. Unlike us, Marx and Zhou focus on the e¤ect of policy changes on the
behaviour of cartel members. Our focus is on establishing how the market evolved
after cartel breakdown and examining what motivated post-cartel mergers. The
primary objective of Hüschelrath and Smuda is closer to ours, but their empirical
analysis is too aggregate and casual to justify the conclusions they draw. Their
merger data relate not to the cartelists themselves, but to all rms worldwide in the
NACE 3 or 4 digit industries to which the cartel markets belong.1 So for example,
they employ aggregate data on mergers by all rms worldwide in the manufacture
of pharmaceutical preparations to proxy the cartel markets in Europe in nely
disaggregated markets such as Citric Acid or Vitamins. Moreover, all data are pooled
across all industries/cartels, there are no controls for mergers in industries in which
there were no cartels, and their empirical analysis is conned to simple comparisons of
two aggregate gures, before and after, without any tests of statistical signicance.
Our study is less aggregate, and relates to subsequent mergers between only the
former cartelists, and addresses head-on the methodological problem of how best to
represent the counterfactual.
Section 2 reviews the conventional argument that post-cartel breakdown mergers
are necessarily driven by coordinated e¤ect motives. It suggests various qualications
and these constitute the key hypotheses of the paper. Section 3 describes the data
and presents some opening descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the survival
analysis, and section 5 looks for evidence of coordinated e¤ects using analysis of
market shares and the reactions of the nancial markets. Section 6 concludes.
1NACE is a statistical classication of economic activities in the European Union. For the list
of codes: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/nace_all.html
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2 The anti-competitive explanation revisited
The theme underlying nearly all the literature described above is that mergers af-
ter cartel breakdown are designed to re-establish collusion, albeit in a tacit form
(coordinated e¤ects).2
2.1 The conventional coordinated e¤ect argument
While this hypothesis is often not fully articulated in the literature, it appears to be
based on the following revealed preference type of argument.
In principle, rms in any market choose between competing and colluding. In
turn, collusion might take the form of hard-core cartel, or it might be softer and tacit.
However, in order to achieve and sustain soft collusion, market structure must be
right, and this may require mergers between some of the rms. Of course, the choice
may be constrained by the basic demand, cost, and entry conditions of the market,
and the presence of the CAmay deter either cartel formation and/or anti-competitive
mergers.
Now, in the case of a market previously but no longer cartelised, collusion was
clearly feasible, and rms had revealed a preference for formal over tacit collusion.
But with the cartel option now removed, rms turn to the second best - tacit collu-
sion. Thus the revealed preference argument has two steps:
a) The cartel solution dominates soft competition via merger. Were this not so,
rms would have opted for mergers in place of a cartel in the rst place.
b) With the cartel option removed, rms will attempt to reinstate collusion, and
this requires restructuring through merger.
2In addition to the literature discussed above, see Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano (2013) who
model the choice of two rms between forming a cartel and merging in order to facilitate subsequent
collusion when faced with a CA which optimises its policy mix between cartel enforcement and
merger control.
5
2.2 Qualications
Without rejecting this line of reasoning, we caution against assuming that mergers
after cartel breakdown necessarily always imply tacit collusion, or, indeed, that tacit
collusion necessarily requires merger. Rather, three important qualications should
be recognised in empirical testing.
2.2.1 Merger may not always be necessary
With the cartel option no longer open, mergers may not always be necessary in order
to achieve the second best of tacit collusion, therefore part (b) need not always apply.
After all, much of the conventional theory of collusion can be applied equally to tacit
collusion and cartels. For example, the basic predictions of the repeated game - that
collusion is more likely the fewer is the number of rms and the more symmetric they
are - are invoked in both the literatures on cartels and coordinated e¤ects mergers.
In these cases, given that the cartel was chosen but is now busted, the second best
tacit collusion may be protable and sustainable for the rms, even without merger.
Harrington (2004) refers to a concept of residual collusion, where a busted cartel
is followed by tacit collusion. Connor (2001) uses the same argument to explain
what happened in the aftermath of the Lysine cartel. A study by Kovacic et al.
(2007) on prices in the post-breakdown period for di¤erent types of vitamins implies
a simple switch to tacit collusion in some cases. They nd that vitamin products
with two conspirators continue as if the explicit conspiracy never stopped, while
products with three or four conspirators return to pre-conspiracy pricing, or lower.
This is also conrmed in an experimental setting by Fonseca and Normann (2012)
, who nd that, after formal communication is no longer possible, rmscarry on
successfully colluding in small numbers cases.
If this previous communication is su¢ cient to sustain tacit collusion, then we
should expect at least some markets to still display collusive outcomes post-cartel
even without merger. This would be more likely, the more concentrated the market
already is, and the more symmetric are the leading rms.
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2.2.2 Cartels may no longer be preferred at time of breakdown
While part (a) of the argument must have applied at the time of the cartels forma-
tion, it may no longer be true at the date of its breakdown. In particular, if the cartel
has already broken down before detection by the CA (we refer to this as having died
a natural death), this suggests that collusion was no longer sustainable - even with
communication - and we can no longer infer that cartel is preferred to merger at the
time of breakdown. But by the same token, if the cartel is unstable, so too will be
tacit collusion - without merger. In other words, we would expect mergers after CA
intervention to be even more prevalent in cases where the cartel has already broken
down.
2.2.3 An alternative e¢ ciencyexplanation
Neither of the above qualications questions the basic hypothesis that the mergers,
where they occur, are motivated by coordination e¤ects. However, there is a more
benevolent explanation for merger after cartel breakdown one which seems to have
been largely ignored in this specic literature.
Suppose that the cartel breakdown has the desired objective from the CAs per-
spective. It leads to a change in prevailing conduct from collusion to competition; as
price falls, marginal rms exit, and some of the exit is via acquisition by other pre-
vious members of the cartel. For example in a free entry model, replacing collusion
with, say, Cournot or Bertrand competition will lead to a reduced number of rms
(Sutton 1991, section 2.2, pp.28-37), and in an asymmetric market the ones that exit
are the least e¢ cient rms (the smallest in Cournot). If so, restructuring by merger
may be a socially e¢ cient market response to the CA intervention.
2.3 Testable hypotheses
This leads to the following testable hypotheses:
H1 Cartel breakdown is followed by higher than normal merger activity in the
years immediately after breakdown.
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Moreover, when a cartel breaks down naturally, this signals a market structure
which is no longer su¢ cient to sustain collusion, even with the benet of commu-
nication. If so, it is even less likely that tacit collusion can be sustained with that
structure, and restructuring through merger is particularly necessary in these cases.
So:
H1a H1 will be especially pronounced for cartels having died a natural death.
On the other hand,
H2 Increased merger activity will be lower in concentrated markets.
This would follow if markets are already su¢ ciently concentrated at breakdown
to sustain subsequent tacit collusion without further merger. But equally, rms may
be deterred by the fear of CA intervention from proposing mergers in already con-
centrated markets (especially when it is known that they were previously cartelised).
2.4 Screens for coordinated e¤ects
Given that these hypotheses, even if supported by the data, are equally explicable in
terms of the tacit collusion and e¢ ciency explanations, this leaves open the obvious
question of how we might distinguish the two. Detailed case studies of behaviour
pre- and post-cartel in individual markets is one route, but our preferred approach
here is to take the sample as a whole and apply the following two screensusing data
which are readily at hand.
1. Structural Screen: how frequently do the mergers lead to market structures
which would normally alert the CA to the possibility of coordinated e¤ects?
2. Expected Protability Screen: how frequently do nancial markets react in a
way consistent with expected coordinated e¤ects (with benecial e¤ects for
both the acquirer and its rivals)?
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
The major source of the data is the decision documents published by the European
Commission (EC) since 1990.3 The usable sample is 84 cartels that were detected
between 1984 and 2009.4 36 of them (42%) had broken down before they were
detected. On average, the cartels had 7 members, lasted for 8 years, and covered
84% of their markets. Most involved agreements on price, but market sharing was
also very common. A third of the cartels had an identiable ringleader.
The cartels involved a total of 593 rms at the dates of breakdown. Data was
collected on all relevant transactions - mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures - be-
tween these former cartelists, thus, this deliberately excludes mergers or acquisitions
of rms who were not previously within the same cartel.5 We included all mergers
after the date of breakdown, rather than the date of detection.6 The sources were:
(i) companieswebsites, in particular annual reports, press releases, investor informa-
tion, company timelines/histories, and so on; (ii) merger decisions documents pub-
lished by the European Commission;7 (iii) National Competition Authorities (CA);
and (iv) business and nancial websites (for example Bloomberg).
In almost exactly half (41) of the cartels, the breakdown was followed by one
or more mergers between previous cartelists (Table A2). There were 128 qualifying
transactions,8 (on average 3 per cartel, but the distribution is highly skewed, with
19 transactions between cartelists in one case). The majority of transactions were
3The data are summarised in Tables A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix.
4The published report typically lags the date of detection by one or more years. In assembling
the sample, we consolidated two decision documents which cover the rubber market, and a number of
reports relating to International Container Shipping cartels. In some other cases (notably vitamins)
a single decision document relates to more than one cartel, but since these are always in very closely
related submarkets, we count them here as a single case.
5Relevantis dened by the 3 or 4 digit NACE industry identied by the Commission in its
decision document. In fact, many of the cartel markets are much more nely dened than even the
4 digit level. In that case, the cartel market belongs to the 3 or 4 digit industry identied by the
EC, but is only a part of that industry.
6These two characteristics of our sample (mergers between former cartelists, after the cartel
breakdown) make it di¤erent from the samples used by other studies in the literature.
7http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/
8The dataset assembled by Kumar et.al (2013) is a subset of 55 of the cartels in our sample.
They identify mergers in 25 cases: 45% of their sample. We nd mergers in 49% of our sample.
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mergers, but 20 per cent were joint ventures.9 43 percent of all transactions were
funded by combinations of cash, share or debt; the remaining were either solely cash,
share or debt funded.10
We also collected data on the market shares of the individual cartelists using
sources such as (i) cartel and merger decision documents published by the EC and
national CAs (ii) companies annual reports (iii) reports and information issued
by relevant trade/industry associations and market intelligence rms/platforms (iv)
business and nancial websites and so on.11 This proved possible for 64 of the car-
tels.12 These data allow us to calculate the HHI index at the time of breakdown for
each market, and to estimate the impacts of 72 of the mergers on market structure
for the structural screen.13
9We found no obvious statistically signicant di¤erences between mergers & JVs for any of the
cartel caracteristics.
10Overall, we nd that cash was the most frequently used funding option in our sample, debt
as a funding option was applied in nearly half of the cases and approximately one third of the
transactions were, to some extent, funded by the exchange of equity.
11The EC does not routinely report exact market share data in its decision documents, but it is
possible to infer individual market shares for most cartels, if sometimes only approximately. Firms
shares are often reported as ranges, for example 10-20%; in such cases we typically employ the
midpoints, subject to moderation where other information is available on an ad hoc basis.
12In addition to the mergers for which we have no market share data, we also exclude 29 mergers
for which closer investigation reveals that there was no direct impact on market shares in the
cartel markets as precisely dened by the EC. This reects a feature of how the data for the
merger database was collected we identied all mergers between previous members of a given
cartel, where the merger occurred within the NACE industry to which the cartel market belonged.
However, often the cartel market, as identied by EC, was more disaggregated than the NACE
industry to which it belongs. Thus these 29 mergers (or joint ventures/transfers of assets) were
conned to the rmsactivities in another country/product line than the specic market in which
the cartel was detected. Although these are excluded for present purposes, they merit attention in
future research - on the possibility that the EC may have dened the cartels product market or
geographic reach too narrowly, or lacked hard evidence that the cartel had a wider reach.
13The mean number of mergers per cartel is almost identical for the 64 cartels for which we have
market share data (1.53) and the 20 for which we do not (1.50).
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4 Merger intensity after cartel breakdown
One potential approach for testing Hypotheses H1 and H2 would be a conventional
di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD). However, we reject this option for various practical14
and conceptual15 reasons and opt instead for a methodology derived from survival
analysis. This provides a relatively simple, but elegant test of the hypotheses by
focusing on the shape of the survival curve, that is the time path of mergers in the
post-breakdown period.
The approach is explained in full below, but some descriptive statistics help
set the scene. Figure 1 plots the cumulated number of mergers between former
cartelists, pooled across all the cartels, with time measured in months after each
cartels breakdown. In aggregate (the bold line), 50% of these mergers occurred
within just 54 months of cartel breakdown, and the merger rate is visibly higher
within these early years than in the years thereafter. Dening an early merger
as one which occurs within 54 months of breakdown, the mean number of early
mergersper rm was 0.02 per annum, while the rate fell to 0.007 in the later years.
In a very approximate way one could think of the early years as the treatment (where
merger activity is directly inuenced by cartel breakdown), while the following years
are the control (su¢ ciently long after breakdown not to have been triggered by the
shock of cartel-breakdown).
Support for this interpretation is provided by aggregate published data on mergers
14Identifying appropriate control markets for such a large sample would be problematic. Typ-
ically, most cartel markets are identied by the EC at a very disaggregated level (see Table 7),
and this means that invariably the most suitable control markets, in terms of similar demand and
cost conditions, lie within the same 3 or 4 digit industries as the cartels. As such, they are very
often populated by the same large diversied multinationals, and therefore unlikely to be genuinely
independent, as required by DiD. In addition, the costs in collecting comparable data would be
considerable, given the very disaggregated market denitions, and the absence of detailed data
sources for the control markets compared to the cartel markets, for which the EC cartel decision
documents are our invaluable source.
15Crucially, the data are right censored: the merger history in each market is observed up to
the common year of observation (2013), but the start dates di¤er between cartels. This means
that censorship is di¤erential across markets, and we have relatively little data on the more recent
cartels, and the power of tests on these cartels would be low. Further, the key hypothesis here is
not the classic before-after switch usually involved in DiD, but rather, that cartel breakdown is a
shock, stimulating a burst of merger activity which then gradually tails o¤s over time.
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Figure 1: Cumulated number of mergers after cartel breakdown
during the relevant period. UK time series statistics for all mergers involving rms
with assets of more than £ 1 million over the period 1998-2012 record an average
merger rate per rm per annum of also 0.007.16 To better reect the geographical and
industry composition of our sample we also compared with EU aggregate statistics,
but in this case for manufacturing only (more than 80% of our sample were in the
manufacturing sector). The EU average annual merger/rm (rms with more than
10 employees) rate in 2005-2006 is 0.016.17 In our sample of manufacturing industries
the annual rate is 0.033 for early mergers and 0.013 for later mergers. So in both
cases, the merger rate in the later years of our sample coincides with typicalrates,
while the rate in the early years following cartel breakdown is 2-3 times higher.18
Returning to Figure 1, the concavity of the aggregate curve is consistent with
Hypothesis H1. Figure 1 also disaggregates by whether or not the cartel had broken
16Source: UK O¢ ce for National Statistics, Mergers and Acquisitions involving UK companies.
17Source: DG ECFIN, European Commission, Mergers and Acquisitions Note.
18The advantage of using the UK data as comparator is that they yield a consistent time series
over roughly the appropriate time period. Alternatively, the EU data are obviously more relevant
geographically and for the a¤ected industries, but only publicly available for 2005 and 2006.
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down before detection, and the concavity is even more pronounced for the subset
which had broken down before detection (shown as having natural death), and this
is consistent with H1a.
However, this preliminary descriptive evidence is not in itself conclusive sup-
port for our hypotheses for two reasons. First, because the population of all former
cartelists (and thus all potential mergers) must decline over time due to exit by acqui-
sition, this curve does not necessarily imply concavity in the merger rate. Second, and
more fundamentally, due to variability across cartels in the date of breakdown, there
is considerable heterogeneity in the number of periods observed post-breakdown.
The mean sample observation period is 166 months, but this varies from 60 to 347
months. This means heterogeneity in the composition of the pool depicted in the
gure, in which later observations are based on increasingly fewer cartels.
It is for precisely these reasons that we employ hazard rates, which allows for
di¤erential censorship within the sample.19 The basic intuition is as follows. In each
market there may be a merger at some time after cartel breakdown initially suppose
only one merger. Then for a sample of markets there is an aggregate survival curve
which shows the growth in the number of markets which have had a merger. This
is depicted in terms of the number of years since breakdown this is not calendar
time since the date of breakdown varies between cartels. Associated with this is the
hazard rate, which shows the probability of merger occurring in a random market t
years after breakdown, given that no merger had previously occurred. Our central
hypothesis - (H1) - can be tested by examining the behaviour of the pooled hazard
curve over time. The counterfactual in this case would be that the hazard rate is
constant, which is undisturbed by the event of cartel breakdown. On the other hand
a monotonically declining hazard rate in the years after breakdown would indicate
that breakdown was a shock which stimulated mergers, which then gradually subsides
over later years.
19The fact that we only observe relatively short post-breakdown periods for the most recent
cartels also partly accounts for the fact that no mergers have been observed in half the markets.
The simple correlation coe¢ cient between length of observation period and number of mergers is
+0.347.
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This would be a standard application of single-event survival analysis,20 in which
the clock starts ticking in any market when a cartel breaks down, and the event
which subsequently may (or may not) occur is a merger. In Section 4.2 we show how
the model can be made more general by allowing for multiple mergers, which occurs
in many of the markets in our sample.
4.1 The hazard model
For this purpose, we require a distribution to describe the shape of the survival curve
which is su¢ ciently exible to have an increasing, decreasing, or constant hazard
rate. There are a number of alternatives, but because of its simplicity, we employ
the Weibull distribution, for which the hazard is:
h(t) = t 1, t  0 (1)
 and  are conventionally referred to as the shape and scale parameters of the
distribution. The scale () parameter captures the pace of merger activity, and
in cross-industry analysis we can allow this to di¤er between markets. The shape
parameter is key for our purposes: if  = 1 the hazard is constant, with  < 1 it is
monotonically decreasing, and with  > 1 it is monotonically increasing. Thus, our
hypothesis that merger activity in the years immediately following cartel breakdown
is more intense can be tested by:
20Survival analysis originates from health applications in which the event of interest is time until
failure; for example, it might be a sample of patients who have had some medical device (such as
an implant) tted, and the subject of the study is how long before the implant fails (if at all).
Patients are all observed at the same point in time, although they have had their implants at
di¤erent times in the past. For some patients the implant may not yet have failed, but for others it
has, at varying intervals after the treatment. Here, we substitute the date of cartel breakdown for
the date of implant and the date of merger for failure. As far as we know, there are no previous
similar applications of survival analysis to mergers. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and others have
successfully employed survival analysis for cartel duration, where failure is naturally dened by
breakdown, but our application di¤ers from theirs in that we focus on the shape of the hazard
curve, whilst accounting for the additional problem of multiple failures (mergers) of cartels.
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H0 :  = 1
H1 :  < 1
In e¤ect, the null is that in each market there is a constant (but di¤erent) un-
derlying merger rate (hazard). However, our hypothesis (H1) is that in the post-
breakdown period, the hazard is highest immediately after breakdown, but gradually
declines over time with mergers more likely to be observed in the years immediately
post-breakdown, but then declining gradually thereafter.
4.2 Allowing for multiple mergers
We now show how this methodology can be adapted to allow for multiple mergers
in each market using a recurrent events survival model. To illustrate the possible
modelling options, Figure 2 plots the history of a given market, in which there
are three mergers, as shown on the central line. The two most commonly21 used
methods to allow for recurrent events (mergers) di¤er in what is assumed about
when individuals (markets) are entered into the risk set (exposed to the risk of a
merger). First (shown below the central line), time is measured from the previous
event: it starts at the time of the cartel breakdown, but each subsequent interval
is measured from the preceding merger. Second, (shown above the central line),
each interval is measured from the date of cartel breakdown, regardless of preceding
mergers, if any.
Thus, depending on how intervals are treated, there are three alternatives. Firstly,
one could ignore recurrent events and focus only on the time at which the rst merger
occurs (irrespective of howmany mergers are to follow). We refer to this as the naive
model (Model 1). Secondly, in allowing for recurrent mergers we could assume that
the waiting times between mergers are dependent and thus, for every merger, time
starts from the preceding event (renewed entry Model 2). Thirdly, one could assume
21See Andersen and Gill (1982) , or Prentice, Williams and Peterson (1981) .
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Figure 2: Alternative treatments of recurrent events
that every merger is timed from the start of the study (entry at start Model 3).
Models 2 and 3 can be thought of as setting two bounds on the estimate of 
when multiple mergers can happen in an industry. In Model 2 each industry spends
a relatively shorter time in the risk set (time starts at previous event), which means
that we are more likely to have many short spells and few long spells in the sample,
implying that  should be the lowest in these models. In Model 3 we are likely to
have some shorter but also many longer spells, implying a higher .
4.3 Results
The MLE estimates of  for all three models are shown in Table 1. To account for
the possible dependence (ties) between failure times (subsequent mergers), standard
errors used to calculate the condence intervals are based on a robustvariance-
covariance matrix.22 Our preference is for model 3 since model 1 discards important
information on subsequent mergers, and model 2 attaches no special importance to
the cartel breakdown as the main stimulus to mergers. Nevertheless, initially we
22See the Online Appendix for further explanation.
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report results for all three models in order to establish the robustness of the main
results.
There are four alternative samples: the full sample of all cartels with either all
transactions (including JVs) or mergers only; then the same split, but only for those
cartels with natural breakdowns.
Table 1: Weibull  estimates for the three alternative treatments of recurrent events
All cartels Cartels with natural
(N = 214) breakdown (N = 75)
All transactions Mergers only All transactions Mergers only
Model 1 0.617 0.568 0.537 0.49
(naive) [0.508, 0.750] [0.464, 0.696] [0.391, 0.739] [0.348, 0.691]
Model 2 0.742 0.725 0.561 0.533
(renewed entry) [0.605, 0.910] [0.587, 0.895] [0.447, 0.703] [0.397, 0.716]
Model 3 0.912 0.894 0.671 0.626
(entry at start) [0.741, 1.123] [0.712, 1.121] [0.533, 0.846] [0.455, 0.860]
1 95 percent condence intervals in brackets.
As can be seen,  < 1 is robust across all three models and all samples.
Result 1: There is higher merger activity immediately following cartel break-
down, which then gradually diminishes over time as predicted by H1.
This result is signicant at the 95% level except for Model 3 for the full sample,
for which signicance is at the 90% level.
When the model is estimated only for the sub-sample of cartels which were de-
tected after natural breakdown (natural breakdowncolumn), the MLE estimates of
 are lower and now very signicantly (99% level) less than unity in all three models:
Result 1a: For cartels that died a natural death, the above result is even
stronger statistically - this is consistent with H1a.
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4.4 Allowing heterogeneity across industries
So far, these results are conditional on the assumption that the Weibull parameters
are constant across all markets, but this is now relaxed by allowing the underlying
merger rate to vary across markets, using an exponential link function:  = e
0xi(tj),
where xi is a vector of covariates.
The most important of these for our purposes is market structure, but various car-
tel characteristics should also be relevant, and these are included as control variables.
The nature of the agreement and organisation of the cartel are devices designed to
facilitate coordination within the cartel, and without them, uncoordinated collusion
may be impracticable. We capture this empirically by distinguishing cartels which
were market-sharing (ms) as opposed to price-xing (pf). Some forms of market
sharing (notably territorial and/or customer allocations) are largely self-enforcing
because defection is transparent, and if so, should still be feasible for tacit collusion.
Similarly, the cartel ringleader (rl) is an organisational response to problems of co-
ordination, monitoring and enforcement. If so, it is less likely that collusion could
survive a cartel bust and implicitly the loss of its leader, without restructuring. The
coverage of the cartel (the proportion of industry sales accounted for by cartelists)
might also reect the external stability of not only the cartel, but also subsequent
tacit coordination. We use the longevity of the cartel (duration) as a proxy for
cartel success to test whether the long-standing familiarity with competitors (due
to involvement in the same cartel) reduces the transaction costs of integration via a
subsequent merger, because of greater trust and less uncertainty.
Table 2 reports estimates for the full sample and our preferred Model 3.23 There
are two specications, depending on how market structure is measured: in (1) we use
HHI, but in (2) it is replaced by its two constituent parts rm numbers (n) and size
23The two other survival models yield very similar results. The natural deathsub-sample is
too small for rigorous testing of a model, which now also includes 8 covariates: the core result,
 < 1 is robustly signicant, but the standard errors of the covariates increase due to small sample
size, reducing their signicance levels. The results are for all transactions (JVs as well as mergers);
but are unchanged if the equations are estimated for mergers only (excluding JVs). All these other
estimates are available on request from the authors.
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asymmetries (measured by the coe¢ cient of variation of market shares, CV 24). By
decomposing HHI into n and CV , we are able to focus more precisely on the role of
asymmetry within concentration, which is of particular interest for coordination.25
Where size asymmetries are large, this implies the presence of a dominant rm and,
without the organisational advantages of the cartel, mergers may be necessary to
consolidate the leaders position.26
The two key ndings in this table are that  remains signicantly less than unity,
and that the merger rate is inversely related to concentration. Thus, H1 is still
conrmed when we allow for heterogeneity between cartels in their underlying merger
rates; and, H2 is conrmed:
Result 2: The underlying merger rate is lower in more concentrated markets;
where market shares are more symmetric, and there are fewer rms.
As anticipated earlier, Result 2 is open to alternative explanations: it may indi-
cate that mergers in concentrated markets are more likely to be deterred by potential
CA intervention; but alternatively it may be that these markets are already su¢ -
ciently concentrated to sustain tacit collusion without further mergers. The result
on symmetry of shares suggests that this e¤ect is driven mostly by markets in which
24The coe¢ cient of variation is a natural measure of asymmetry in the HHI index. It is easily
shown that: HHI =
Pn
i=1 s
2
i = (1 +CV
2)=n. where n is number of rms, s is the market share of
rm i and CV is the coe¢ cient of variation.
25On collusion and symmetry, see, inter alia, Mason et al. (1992) , Lambson (1995) , Davidson
and Deneckere (1990) Davidson & Deneckere (1990), Pénard (1997) and Ivaldi et al. (2003) .
Similarly, Vasconcelos (2005) nds that collusion is hindered by asymmetry-increasing mergers, as
do Compte et al. (2002) , but only if aggregate capacity in the market is limited.
26This is the single dominance story, where collusion may work through price leadership
(Mouraviev and Rey 2011), but others show that some level of asymmetry is conducive to col-
lusion (Ganslandt, Persson and Vasconcelos 2012), rather than forbearance amongst a small group
of equals. Mouraviev and Rey (2011) nd that in a Bertrand setting, price leadership restores the
scope for (perfect) collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. Gans-
landt, Persson and Vasconcelos (2012) introduce an indivisible cost of collusion, which one of the
rms in the collusion has to bear, and which creates an incentive for rms to make markets more
asymmetric by mergers. The intuition behind this is that the indivisible cost should be borne by
a single (large) rm. In this setting rms may merge to increase asymmetry. Andreoli-Versbach
and Franck (2013) show that in the Italian retail petrol market price leadership work only after the
market leader introduced a policy of sticky prices. Harrington (2006) suggests that it is typically
one rm who undertakes the price and quantity monitoring tasks in a cartel.
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Table 2: Weibull hazard rates, allowing for heterogeneity across markets
All transactions (N=159) Mergers only (N=138)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
HHI -3.822** -4.269***
(0.973) (1.064)
Coe¢ cient of variation 0.762** 0.674*
(0.364) (0.385)
Number of cartel members 0.035** 0.041**
(0.017) (0.019)
Ringleader -0.118 -0.486* -0.134 -0.431
(dummy) (0.229) (0.256) (0.260) (0.286)
Price-xing cartel 0.301 0.580* 0.091 0.387
(dummy) (0.329) (0.345) (0.304) (0.334)
Market sharing cartel -0.288 -0.442* -0.081 -0.290
(dummy) (0.285) (0.260) (0.294) (0.281)
Duration of the cartel 0.005 0.001 0.014 0.013
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Proportion of market 0.444 0.971 0.893 1.441*
covered by the cartel (0.590) (0.668) (0.690) (0.772)
constant -3.990** -6.246*** -4.326*** -6.663***
(0.775) (0.800) (0.864) (0.904)
Weibull shape parameter () 0.846*** 0.850*** 0.817*** 0.813***
(0.067) (0.069) (0.071) (0.073)
1 Signicance levels are denoted as: + P < 0:10; * P < 0:05; ** P < 0:01. Standard errors
in brackets.
2 Coe¢ cients are displayed in non-exponentiated form.
3 Source: EC cartel decision reports and the authorscalculations
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mergers are more likely to have coordinated e¤ects. But again, this may reect de-
terrence (more symmetry and fewer rms typically imply less likely merger approval)
or because these markets are already conducive to collusion.27
The results on the control variable covariates are mixed, and unstable between the
two equations. Weakly signicant results with expected signs are found in equation
2: market sharing cartels have lower, and price xing cartels higher, merger rates.28
Cartels with a ringleader are less likely to have subsequent merger activity, perhaps
because followers have learned the benet of following the leaders price increases,
and this continues even once the former cartel has been disbanded - mergers are not
an alternative to the function of the ringleader (notably punishment). However, we
nd no evidence that either the duration29 of the cartel, as a proxy for cartel success,
or the coverage of the cartel has signicant impact.
5 Assessing competing explanations
The above results provide conrmation of the key hypotheses of the paper, but they
cannot discriminate between the alternative explanations  tacit collusion versus
market e¢ ciency. In this section therefore, we apply two screens, based on more
disaggregated data on the individual mergers, to assess how many of them might
have coordinated e¤ects.
27Because we focus on the hazard of mergers (the probability of an imminent merger conditional
on previous merger history) there is no need to control for the fact that with every merger there
are fewer rms in the market and thus the probability of mergers is reduced.
28In a slightly modied set of models we controlled for the ordering of subsequent mergers by
including a covariate counting the number of previous mergers. Estimates remain in the same
region. These results are available on request from the authors.
29Although we found that early mergers di¤er in the time lag between the announcement of
the transaction and the actual transaction consummation date: 86 days for early mergers (mergers
before the median duration), and 159 days for late mergers (mergers after the median duration).
This may imply smaller transaction costs for early mergers - probably due to the familiarity between
the merging parties.
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5.1 Market share analysis: the structural screen
The purpose here is to assess how many of the mergers might have had the potential
for coordinated e¤ects, judged by structural indicators. To do this, we estimate
how each merger a¤ects the market structures of the industry concerned. These are
hypothetical estimates in two respects: (1) the market share of a newly merged rm
is assumed to be the combined shares of the two merging parties,30 and (2) this
assumes that the CA does not intervene.31
Table 3 shows the results, employing a simple typology which uses data only on
the shares of the two largest rms (S1 and S2) in each market. A market involves
single dominance (SD) if the largest rm has at least 50% of the market. If not,
there may be collective dominance (CD) if the largest two rms have at least 50%.
Otherwise, the market does not involve dominance (ND). Although very simple,
this classication corresponds broadly with traditional denitions of market domi-
nance used in the competition policy literature. For present purposes, we are most
interested in CD, that is coordinated e¤ects.
Table 3 shows how many markets were in each category before and after the
mergers. So for example, 25 markets involved no dominance at the time of cartel
breakdown; in 20 of these there were mergers, and in 8 of these, the e¤ect was to
shift the market from ND to CD.
As can be seen, most (39=64 = 60%) markets already involved dominant rms at
the time of their breakdown usually collective dominance (33). It is also clear that
mergers were less frequent in markets with already dominant rms: in only 30% (12
of 39) of CD=SD markets, as opposed to 80% of the ND markets. Neither of these
ndings is very surprising: we would expect a large number of cartel markets to be
concentrated, with symmetric shares amongst leading rms. The negative result on
30This is conventional CA practice in merger investigations. This is subject to two obvious
qualications: (i) most oligopoly theory suggests that following merger, any nearly merged rm
will raise price and contract scale rather than maintain it at the combined pre-merging scales of
the parties, (ii) we abstract from any other changes in market structure which are independent of
the merger.
31In fact, in very few cases were there interventions by either the EC or national authorities,
Davies and Ormosi (2014) .
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Table 3: Number of cartels and mergers by the cartel markets structure
Structure after mergers
Structure at Number of Number of cartels SD CD ND
breakdown cartels with mergers
Single dominance (SD) 6 1 6
Collective dominance (CD) 33 11 1 32
No dominance (ND) 25 20 8 17
total 64 32 7 40 17
1 In markets where there was more than one merger, these gures show their cumulated e¤ect.
2 SD denotes a market in which the largest rm has a market share of at least 50%; CD where
the two largest rms have a combined share of at least 50%; ND is neither.
HHI in Table 2 has already shown that there are relatively fewer mergers in more
concentrated markets. A further nding from the table provides the answer to our
question:
Result 3: In 19 markets (30%), the market share screen raises concern on
potential coordinated e¤ects.
These are the 11 in which there was already collective dominance before the
mergers, and the 8 in which there was not previously collective dominance, but in
which the mergers would create CD.
It is these markets in particular, for which a structural screen should suggest
the potential for coordinated e¤ects. Of course, market shares alone are insu¢ cient
evidence that the mergers were either motivated by, or resulted in, anti-competitive
behaviour, but they do provide a screen.
5.2 Event studies
Event studies are a well-established methodology for assessing whether mergers will
have coordinated e¤ects an e¢ cient capital market should react to announcement
of such a merger by increasing the values of both the acquiring rm and its rivals.
We employ this methodology here, and pose two questions. First, is there evidence
23
that mergers after cartel breakdown di¤er from typicalmergers? In particular are
they more frequently value-enhancing for the acquirers? Second, in how many of
the mergers did the markets judge the e¤ect on both acquiring and rival rms to be
positive? We shall distinguish between mergers in the early years after breakdown
and those in later years: as explained in Section 4, an early merger is dened as one
occurring before the sample median duration (54 months after breakdown).
5.2.1 Data on stock prices
These data were collected for the markets in which the acquirer was listed and we
could identify the exact date of the merger announcement. We were able to do this
for 49 mergers (40% of the sample). The mean number of rivals (with stock-market
data) per merger was 5.32
The rmsand market returns were estimated from the Thomson One Banker
dataset. For normal returns we used a window of 240 trading days, and calculated
the abnormal returns as the di¤erence between rm is return and the market return.
To eliminate problems from information leakage around the event date, we cumulated
these abnormal returns (CAR) for the event window. Three alternative windows were
used: [-1,1], [-3,3], and [-5,5].33
Our observations on the date of the event (date of merger announcement) are
from publicly available sources, typically Google. Inevitably, there is the possibility
of imprecision in the sense that information on the merger might have leaked out to
investors before it was rst published in business dailies. For this reason we would
be reluctant to employ overly narrow event windows; on the other hand, too wide
windows are more likely to include confounding e¤ects. Therefore in the following
we report results based on the [-3,3] window.34
32Because it is not directly relevant to our analysis, we did not include targetcompanies in our
analysis. Nevertheless, from the 49 mergers only 18 targetcompanies were listed (and 10 of these
were joint ventures).
33These windows are the most frequently used in merger related event studies.
34Results with di¤erent event windows di¤ered in magnitude but not in their sign, and are
available from the authors on request.
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5.2.2 Results
As a preliminary, we nd that the mean CAR for acquiring rms in early mergers is
signicantly positive, but is not for later mergers. Our reading of previous general
event studies on mergers, such as Jarrell and Bradley (1980) , Ruback and Jensen
(1983) , and Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001) is that, typically, the acquiring
company su¤ers a reduction or no change in its valuation as a result of the merger.
Table 4: Financial markets assessment of the mergers: acquiring rms average
CARs
All transactions Mergers only
N CAR N CAR
Early mergers 24 0.035* 18 0.044*
(0.015) (0.018)
Late mergers 25 0.000 19 -0.006
(0.018) (0.020)
1 Note: Early (late) mergers are within (beyond) the
median duration from cartel breakdown.
2 Signicance levels are denoted as: + P < 0:10; *
P < 0:05; ** P < 0:01. Standard errors in brackets.
This suggests that, in our case, the later mergers are fairly typical of what has
been found in previous literature, but that early mergers are more likely than usual
to be value-enhancing for acquiring rms.35 This leads to the following result:
Result 4: Mergers in the early years after cartel breakdown are more than
usually value-enhancing for acquiring rms.
Turning to the rivals, as Stigler (1950) rst observed, in some circumstances, it
might be advantageous for rms to reside outside a merger: If there are relatively
few rms in the industry, the major di¢ culty in forming a merger is that it is more
35Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that cash-funded mergers are more likely to have positive
CAR. However, we found no di¤erence between early and late mergers regarding the funding of the
merger.
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protable to be outside a merger than to be a participant.Mergers also increase
market concentration and hence facilitate collusion (Stigler 1964), which may also
be advantageous for rival rms. Fee and Thomas (2004) , Shahrur (2005), Duso et
al. (2007) , and Clougherty and Duso (2009) all look at the e¤ect of mergers on rival
rms and o¤er a general support that rival rms benet from such merger events.36
Table 5 records the number of cases (for mergers only37) for which acquirers
value increased (A+), and then, the number of these for which the rivalsvalues also
increased (R+).38
Table 5: Number and % of cases where the acquirer and the rival CARs are positive
All A+ A+R+
Early mergers
# 18 15 10
% 0.833 0.556
Late mergers
# 19 9 4
% 0.473 0.21
Total
# 37 24 14
% 0.648 0.378
1 Early (late) mergers are within (beyond) the median du-
ration from cartel breakdown
2 A+ denotes the number number of mergers in which the
acquirers CAR are positive, amd A+R+ denotes the num-
ber of those in which the rivalsCAR are also positive.
As can be seen, over 80% of early mergers are value generating for acquirers
(market power or e¢ ciency) while less than half of later mergers are. This is as
expected given Result 3.
In addition, the proportion of these which are also benecial to rivals is larger for
early than late mergers. Taken together, and identifying (A+ R+) as coordinated
36Other reasons include the information e¤ect: the merger signals the possibility that the rival
may also be a merger target soon, see: Eckbo (1983) and Song and Walking (2000) .
37Similar magnitudes were obtained when all transactions were included in the sample. These
results are available on request from the authors.
38Typically there was more than one rival, and where some recorded positive, and some negative,
CARs, we show the predominant e¤ect.
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e¤ects leads us to our nal result:
Result 5: Half of early mergers have the potential to be anti-competitive,
whilst only one quarter of late mergers do.
Taking the results of these two screens together suggests that mergers in response
to a cartel breakdown will often, but by no means always, lead to market structures
which are consistent with the potential for coordinated e¤ects, and the nancial
markets expect this to happen in a sizeable proportion of cases.
6 Conclusions
This paper conrms that after a cartel breaks down, there is typically a period of
increased merger activity amongst the former cartelists. Its methodological novelty
derives from an application of survival analysis to an unbalanced pooled sample of
cartels with di¤ering dates of breakdown and therefore di¤ering periods of observa-
tion.
It nds that the increased merger activity post breakdown is most pronounced
in cartels which are detected after they have already broken down. This might be
because these are failedcartels, and if rms are to re-instate collusion, albeit tacit,
they will need to create a structure which facilitates tacit collusion, by merger. It
also nds that merger activity post-breakdown is less pronounced in markets which
are already concentrated. This might be because tacit collusion is already possible
in these markets, without further consolidation through merger. On the other hand,
it may be that the fear of CA intervention deters rms from merging in already
concentrated markets.
Therefore, our results are consistent with what is the prevailing explanation in
the existing literature, that the coordinated e¤ects motivation drives mergers. But
there is also an alternative explanation, with very di¤erent policy implications. We
refer to this as the e¢ ciency explanation: the breakdown of a cartel has the desired
e¤ect (for the CA), as competition now sti¤ens, weaker marginal rms exit often by
acquisition.
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In the nal part of the paper, we run the sample markets through two alternative
screens in order to gauge how frequently the anti-competitive explanation might
dominate. In the rst, we compute the expected changes in market structure and
examine how many would satisfy the necessary structural conditions for CAs to
pursue a coordinated e¤ects theory of harm. In the second, we undertake an event
study analysis of the nancial marketsreactions to these mergers. Here we focus
on how frequently the valuations of both acquirers and rivals are marked up as
a consequence of merger announcement. Both of these screens suggest that the
coordinated e¤ects explanation applies in at least a large minority of cases. For
these markets at least the evidence points in the direction of mergers as a second
best means of re-instating (tacit) collusion, once a cartel has broken down.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Recurrent event analysis
Following conventional notation in recurrent event analysis39 denote the merger event
history in any market by N(t) = fn(u) : u  tg, where n(u) is the number of mergers
39For example a comprehensive treatment of recurrent event models in the area of biostatistics
is given by Cook and Lawless (2007) .
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in [0; t).40 We also allow for the possibility that hazard rates are a function of market
and cartel characteristics (denoted by X). Then the hazard (intensity) function is:
hft j N(t);Xg = lim
t!0
Pr
[t  Tn(t)+1 < t+t j N(t);X]
t
(A.1)
By combining (1) and (A.1) the above three scenarios can be modelled in the
following way:
1. Naivemodel: h(t j X) = t 1.
2. Renewed entry model: h(t j N(t);X) = (t  tn(t)) 1. This follows Andersen
and Gill (1982) and the rst model in Prentice et al. (1981) .41
3. Entry at start model: h(t j N(t);X) = t 1. This model is loosely based on
the second model in Prentice et al. (1981).42
Now consider the implication for a sample of m industries, when the set of all
industries is fG1; G2; :::; Gmg. Denote the total number of mergers in industryGi (i =
1; 2; :::;m) by ki. Allowing for right-censoring in each industry there are si = ki + 1
intervals in each industry. For each interval denote the total number of industries at
risk by ms, and the number of industries with mergers by rs.
Let ts1; ts2; :::; tsrs ; t
+
srs+1; :::; t
+
sms be the ordered failure (merger) times in interval
s,43 with
P
s1 rs exact times, and - because the study period has a natural cuto¤
point at the time of writing this study - we also have
P
s1(ms   rs) right-censored
intervals. The likelihood of observing this sequence is given by:
40The counting process N(t) is equivalent of the random failure times T1 < ::: < Tn(t), and n(t)
records the cumulative number of mergers, n(t) =
P1
k=1 I(Tk  t), where Tk is the time of the k-th
merger.
41We replace the Cox PH model used in these papers by a fully parametric approach.
42Both Andersen and Gill (1982), and Prentice et al. (1982) used a stratied model. We opt
against this, as it would require estimating parameters of a baseline hazard for each industry for
each possible strata (interval), which would have been too demanding from our relatively small
sample.
43For simplicity we assume that the failure process is orderly (there cannot be two mergers in
the same month).
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L =
Y
s1
hYrs
j=1
f(tj)
Yms
j=rs+1
S(t+j )
i
(A.2)
Where the density function f(t) represents the information that can be obtained
from observed uncensored survival times and the survival function S(t) captures
observed right-censored times.
Using theWeibull density (t 1e (t)

) and survival functions (e (t)

) together
with (A.2) the recurrent event, right-censored likelihood functions to be estimated
for the three models described are given below. For each model we assumed that
the sample is progressively censored (markets are entered at di¤erent times and the
study lasts a predetermined period of time).
In the naive model there is only one interval analysed, therefore the ordered
survival data is: t1  t2  :::  tr; t+r+1; :::; t+m and the likelihood of observing this
data given a Weibull distribution is:
L1 =
Yr
j=1
t 1j e
 (tj)
Ym
j=r+1
e (t
+
j )

, t > 0 (A.3)
In the renewed entry model denote the gap time between two events in the same
industry by us = ts   t(s 1). In this case the ordered (observed and censored) gap
times are given by: us1  us2  :::  usrs ; u+srs+1; :::; u+sms and the likelihood function:
L2 =
Y
s1
hYrs
j=1
u 1sj e
 (usj)
Yms
j=rs+1
e (usj)

i
, t > 0 (A.4)
In the entry at start model the ordered survival data is: ts1  ts2  ::: 
tsrs ; t
+
srs+1; :::; t
+
sms and the likelihood function is:
L3 =
Y
s1
hYrs
j=1
t 1sj e
 (tsj)
Yms
j=R+1
e (t
+
sj)

i
, t > 0 (A.5)
As the emphasis is on estimating  initially we estimate  and  without allowing
for heterogeneity across cartels.44
44Note that 1   3 di¤er from Prentice et al. (1981) not only in that they are fully parametric
but also in that  and  are homogeneous across intervals. Assuming di¤erent hazard functions for
each time interval between events would mean estimating max(Ki)  2 parameters (in the model
without covariates), which we rejected for dimensionality reasons.
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A.2 Obtaining MLE of  and 
For Model 1 the MLE of  and  can be obtained following procedures on parametric
censored survival models, such as Lee and Wang (2003, p.178). In previous literature
we did not nd derivation of the MLE of the two Weibull parameters in the two
recurrent-event models used in this paper therefore we briey report how the Model
3 estimates were obtained (Model 2 is derived analogously but time is measured by
us = ts   t(s 1)).
Denote the set of estimable parameters by  = f; g, then the loglikelihood
function is given by :
l3() =
X
s1
(
rs ln() + rs ln()+Prs
j=1 [(  1) ln(tsj)  (ts)] 
Pms
j=rs+1
(t+sj)

)
For l3() the MLE of  and  can be obtained by solving the following two
equations simultaneously:
X
s1
nrs

+
Xrs
j=1
 1tsj  
Xms
j=rs+1
 1t+sj

o
= 0X
s1

rs

+
Xrs
j=1
ln(tsj)  (tsj) ln(tsj) 
Xms
j=rs+1
(t+sj)
 ln(t+sj)

= 0
There is no closed solution for this system so iterative techniques à la Newton-
Raphson were used.
The 95% condence intervals given in Table 1 were obtained using:
[b  Z0:025pv; b+ Z0:025pv]
and
[b  Z0:025pv;b+ Z0:025pv]
where Z0:025 is the 0.975 percentile point of the standard normal distribution.
v and v are the two diagonal elements of an adjusted covariance matrix. Lin
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(1994) showed that the covariance matrix given by I 1 =  @2l(b)=@@0 does not
take into account the additional correlation in the data due to the potential lack of
independence among mergers in the same industry. Therefore it is not appropriate
for testing or constructing condence intervals for recurrent event data. Lin and Wei
(1989) proposed dealing with this in the following way.
Divide the sample into m industries fG1; G2; :::; Gmg, and denote the matrix of
the group e¢ cient score residuals by G, which has dimensions m 2 because there
are m industries and 2 parameters to be estimated. Then the robust covariance
matrix is given by:
V = I 1G0GI 1
A.3 Additional tables
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for cartels
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of cartel members at breakdown 84 7.393 5.280 2 33
Cartel duration (years) 84 8.317 6.418 0 35
Coverage (cartel share of the market) 72 0.843 0.167 0.220 1.000
HHI at cartel breakdown 64 0.292 0.136 0.078 0.844
CV at cartel breakdown 64 0.708 0.333 0.094 1.958
Proportion of cartels with ringleaders 78 0.333 0.474 0.000 1.000
Proportion of market sharing cartels 83 0.699 0.462 0.000 1.000
Proportion of price xing cartels 83 0.819 0.387 0.000 1.000
Proportion of bid rigging cartels 83 0.217 0.415 0.000 1.000
Proportion of leniency cases 84 0.714 0.454 0.000 1.000
Proportion of natural breakdown cartels 84 0.420 0.497 0.000 1.000
Cartels followed by
No merger 43
1 merger 14
2 mergers 8
3 mergers 8
4+ mergers 11
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Table A2: List of post-breakdown Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures
Cartel Cartel breakdown Year of Merger Firm 1 in Merger Firm 2 in Merger CAR of Firm1
CRT Glass 2004 2008 Asahi Glass Schott 0.02826
LCD 2006 2008 LG Philipps Hannstar -0.05064
Airfreight 2006 2011 KLM Martinair
2008 Japan Airlines Quantas
Prestressing Steel 2002 2005 Companhia Previdente Italcables
2004 Companhia Previdente Emesa-Trelería/Industrias Galycas
DRAM 2002 2003 Mitsubishi Toshiba 0.10064
2003 Mitsubishi Hitachi 0.01431
2003 Inneon Nanya
2003 Elpida Mitsubishi
2003 Mitsubishi Toshiba 0.03635
2003 Samsung Toshiba -0.04258
2008 Micron Inotera (Inneon/Nanya) 0.14818
2011 Hynix Toshiba -0.12180
2013 Micron Elpida
Power Transformers 2003 2003 Siemens Alstom 0.00951
2004 Areva Alstom
2009 Areva Siemens
2010 Alstom Schneider/Areva
Removal Service 2003 2007 Team Relocations Arthur Pierre
Paran Wax 2005 2007 Eni Exxon 0.01632
2007 Sasol Shell -0.03641
GIS 2004 2005 Siemens VA Tech 0.00097
2007 Mitsubishi Areva 0.07752
2008 Schneider Fuji 0.07751
2010 Alstom Areva 0.00794
Rubber 2002 2006 Bayer Dow 0.0055
Hydrogen Peroxide 2000 2001 FMC Degussa 0.7827
2001 Degussa Edison SpA / Ausimont
2002 Solvay Ausimont 0.03157
2002 Degussa Edison SpA / Ausimont
2003 Kemira (Polargas) Air Liquide 0.03334
2012 Solvay Air Liquide 0.08885
Copper Fittings 2001 2002 Aalberts Yorkshire (IMI) -0.03219
2005 Aalberts Pegler/Tomkins 0.07313
2006 Aalberts Legris / Comap 0.07527
Bitumen Netherlands 2002 2002 BAM HBG
Raw Tobacco Italy 2001 2005 Dimon Transcatab
MCAA 1999 1999 Akzo Hoechst 0.07154
Industrial Thread 1996 1999 Coats Hicking Pentecost (Barbour )
2000 Coats Dollfus/Donisthorpe
2001 Amann Donisthorpe
2000 Guetermann Zwicky
2008 Amann Oxley
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Cartel Cartel breakdown Year of Merger Firm 1 in Merger Firm 2 in Merger CAR of Firm1
Copper Plumbing Tubes 2001 2001 Outokumpu Boliden 0.31565
2002 KME IMI
2002 Boliden HME
2003 Outokumpu Boliden 0.04600
Sorbates 1996 2002 Daicel Hoechst Nanning -0.06396
Carbon and Graphite 1999 1999 Schunk Ho¤mann & Co
Specialty Graphite 1998 2002 SGL Tokai
2005 Carbone Lorraine NSCC
Plasterboard 1998 2002 Lafarge BPB
2002 BPB Gyproc BeNeLux
2011 Knauf Lafarge
Food Flavour Enhancers 1998 2006 Takeda Deasang
Dutch Industrial Gases 1997 1998 Air Liquide BOC
1999 Air Liquide BOC 0.02417
2000 Air Products AGA
2001 Air Liquide Messer
2001 Air Products Messer
2002 Air Liquide BOC 0.03893
2004 Air Liquide Messer -0.05705
2007 Air Products BOC 0.02641
Austrian Banks 1998 1999 ÖVAG NÖ Landesbank-Hypothekenbank
2000 BAWAG PSK
Vitamins 1994 2001 BASF Takeda 0.01056
2001 Sumitomo Aventis -0.07348
2002 Takeda Sumitomo 0.13663
Sodium Gluconate 1995 1995 Avebe Akzo
Luxemburg Brewers 2000 2000 Diekirch Les brasseries réunies (Mousel)
2005 Nationale-Bo¤erding Battin
Graphite Electrodes 1997 2002 SGL Tokai -0.01447
German Banks 1999 2002 Commerzbank Dresdner Bank
2009 Commerzbank Dresdner Bank -0.13077
Carbonless Paper 1995 1998 AWA Bollore
Shipping Agreements 1992 1993 TMM Tacomar
1994 Senator DSR
1996 P&O Nedlloyd
1997 Hanjin Senator
1999 Maersk Land-Sea Service
2003 MISC NOL
2005 Maersk P&O Nedlloyd -0.00850
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Cartel Cartel breakdown Year of Merger Firm 1 in Merger Firm 2 in Merger CAR of Firm1
Seamless Steel Tubes 1994 1997 Mannesmann Vallourec
2002 NKK Kawasaki
2012 Nippon Steel Sumitomo Metal 0.02344
Pre-insulated pipe 1995 1997 Logostor Pan Isovit
1999 Logostor Tarco
2009 Logostor Dansk Rorindustri (Starpipe)
British Sugar 1990 2004 Napier James Bugett
Alloy Surcharge 1995 1996 Krupp Acciai Speciali Terni
2000 Krupp Thyssen Usinor
Ferry Operators 1993 1996 P&O North Sea
1998 P&O Stena
2002 P&O Stena
Steel Beam 1991 1997 Aceralia (Empresa) Siderúrgica Aristrain
1997 Arbed Empresa Nacional
1999 Thyssen Krupp Hoesch
PVC 1987 1997 BASF Hoechst
1998 Wacker Huels
1999 Solvay BASF -0.08594
2000 BASF Shell
2002 Solvay Montedison (Edison / Ausimont) 0.03157
Cement 1989 1990 Aalborg Blue Circle
1992 Italcementi Ciments Français
1993 Heidelberger SA Cimenteries CBR
1993 Heidelberger NV-ENCI
1994 Holderbank Cedest
1994 Dyckerho¤ Ciments Luxembourgeois
1995 Unicem Italcementi
1995 EUROC AB Aker A/S (Norcem)
1996 Heracles Halkis
1997 Alsen-Breitenburg Nordcement
1999 Heidelberger Aker / Scancem
1999 Fratelli (Buzzi) Unicem
1999 Blue Circle Heracles
2001 Buzzi Dyckerho¤ -0.24582
2001 Lafarge Blue Circle
2003 Holcim Hispacement 0.12322
2004 Cementir Aalborg
2004 Irish Cement / CRH SECIL
2007 Heidelberger Hanson -0.03855
Carton Board 1991 1992 Mayr-Melnhof Laakmann Karton GmbH
1994 Enso-Gutzeit Tampella Española (Enso)
1998 Stora Enso-Gutzeit
2001 Mayr-Melnhof Gruber & Weber GmbH
UK Tractors 1984 1991 Fiat Ford New Holland
1995 Same-Lamborghini Deutz-Fahr
1999 New Holland (Fiat) Case -0.04713
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